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1 Overview
Steganography is the task of concealing a message within a medium such that the presence of the hidden
message cannot be detected. Beyond the standard scope of private-key steganography, steganography is
also potentially interesting from other perspectives; for example, the prospect of steganographic parallels
to components in public-key cryptography is particularly interesting. In this project, I begin with an
exploration of public-key steganography, and I continue by condensing existing work into a unifying
design paradigm that (a) admits provably secret public- and private-key constructions and (b) provides
for a conceptual decoupling of channel considerations and steganographic goals, ultimately implying both
universal constructions and constructions with channel-specific optimizations.
This work is by-and-large a survey of applications of this paradigm: specifically, I use the framework to
achieve provably secure distributed steganography, obtain new public-key steganographic constructions us-
ing alternative assumptions, and give discussion of channel-specific optimizations allowed by cryptography
as a channel and natural language channels and challenges facing practical deployment of steganographic
systems at scale. 1
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2 Paper: Public-key Steganography, an Alternative to Private-
key Steganography
“Public-key Steganography” is a work by Ahn and Hopper which explores a formal definition of provably
secure public-key steganography [4]. Unlike in the case of private-key steganography, public-key steganog-
raphy allows for the exchange of covert messages without exchanging secrets. Though an interesting
prospect, the authors note that this goal is information-theoretically impossible; as such, the authors in
this work attempt to provide what they claim to be the first complexity-theoretic basis for proving and
achieving secure public-key stegosystems using standard cryptographic assumptions.
To provide some motivation for their work, Ahn and Hopper begin with the standard presentation of
the prisoners problem: Alice and Bob are attempting to covertly communicate in prison without alert-
ing Ward to said covert communication, noting that the asymmetric nature of public-key steganography
would not require an explicit secret exchange between Alice and Bob (before or after) coming to prison,
unlike in the private-key setting.
Towards defining steganographic security in a public-key settings, the authors provide a slightly mod-
ified presentation of the notion of a channel from [1]. (Initially) Rather than abstracting a channel as a
statistical distribution of labeled bit sequences, this work abstracts a channel as a statistical distribution
C over sequences of documents s ∈D∗.2
2This abstraction improves upon the original formulation given in [1], but we will see that they impose similar restrictions.
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The authors denote by Ch the marginal distribution on the next document conditioned on the next
l documents; similarly, they denote by Clh the marginal distribution on the next l documents. They say
that a channel C is L-informative if there exist constants L > 0, b > 0, α > 0 such that for all L-length
document histories h ∈ DL,
PrC[h] = 0 or H∞(Clbh ) > α
in other words, that the minimum entropy among all l ∗ b-length document sequences in the support of
Clbh is some constant α.
The authors define a public-key stegosystem as a triple of algorithms (KG,SE,SD). KG is an al-
gorithm which returns as output a public-private key-pair (PK,SK); SE is a function SE(PK,m,h,O)
which takes as input a public key PK, a hiddentext m, a message history h, and a channel oracle O and
outputs a sequence of ‘documents’ s = s1, ..., sl, the stegotext, from the support of Clh. SD is a function
SD(SK,s, h) which returns the hiddentext m contained within the stegotext s. The correctness of a
public-key stegosystem is defined by the condition
∀m ∈ {0,1}p(k), P r(PK,SK)[SD(SK,SE(PK,m,h), h) =m] ≥ 1 − µ(k)
where k is the security parameter and µ(k) is a negligible function.
With respect to the security of a public-key stegosystem, the authors define two settings: chosen
hiddentext secrecy and chosen stegotext secrecy. In the setting of chosen hiddentext secrecy, a
keypair (PK,SK) is drawn according to security parameter k, and the adversary W is given access to
PK and Ch for arbitrary histories h. W then works to generate a challenge history hW and message mW .
W is then given a document sequence s, where s = SE(PK,hW ,mW ) or s⇐ C ∣SE(PK,hW ,mW )∣hW . W must
output a guess, 1 if he believes s is the steganographically hidden message, 0 if he believes it was drawn
according to the channel distribution ChW . The advantage of an adversary is then defined as
Adv(W ) = ∣Pr(PK,SK)[W C(PK,s = SE(⋅, ⋅, ⋅)) = 1] −Pr(PK,SK)[W C(PK,s⇐ ChW ) = 1]∣
A public-key stegosystem is considered secret under chosen hiddentext attack if, for any adversary W
running in time polynomial in k, Adv(W ) is a negligible function in k.
Chosen stegotext secrecy is defined to model a scenario in which an adversary W is able to modify
or inject stegotexts into the stream of communication from Alice to Bob and then uses hiddentexts out-
put by Bob to perform steganalysis. The setting given is essentially equivalent to that given for chosen
hiddentext secrecy, except Alice and Bob instead maintain a public-private pair that is kept secret from
Ward. Due to the fact that the solution presented reduces to keeping steganographic public keys private
within a steganographic trust architecture, and due to doubts about the necessity of the premise of chosen
stegotext secrecy, I omit precise details [see section 1.1.2 for discussion].
The specific constructions provided by Ahn and Hopper in [4] rely on the existence of public-key cryp-
tography defined under a slightly modified definition of security. The authors define IND-$CPA security
as follows for a public-key encryption scheme: given a probabilistic scheme H = ((PK,SK),E,D), define
the advantage of an adversary A as
Adv
$cpa
H (A) = ∣PrPK[A(PK,EPK(⋅))] −PrPK[A(PK,F (⋅) U{∣EPK(⋅)∣}]∣
(Note that U{∣x∣} refers to the uniform distribution over ∣x∣-bit strings.) Equivalently stated, IND−$CPA
requires that ciphertexts obtained by encrypting using a public key be indistinguishable from random.
The authors provide and prove two IND-$CPA public-key encryption schemes; the first of these is a
modification of RSA using Yung’s Probabilistic Bias Removal Method (PBRM); the second is a modified
manifestation of ElGamal relying on a pseudo-random private-key encryption scheme (i.e., a PRP).
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The authors also require the existence of what they call unbiased functions with respect to the channel
distribution C. A function f is unbiased with respect to C if the quantity
∣Prx⇐C[f(x) = 0] − 1
2
∣
is negligible in the security parameter of the system.
The authors then additionally rely on a basic encoding/decoding scheme which utilizes f to embed
uniformly distributed strings within documents sampled from the conditional channel distribution:
Algorithm 1 Basic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure encode(c1, ..., cl ∈ {0,1}l, h ∈ D∗, k)
2: for i = 1...l do
3: Set j = 0
4: while (j = 0ORf(si)! = ci)AND(j ≤ k) do
5: si ⇐ Ch
6: Increment j
7: end while
8: Set h = h ∣∣ si
9: end for
10: Return s1, ..., sl
11: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Basic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure decode(s1, ..., sl)
2: for i = 1...l do
3: Set ci = f(si)
4: end for
5: Return c1, ..., cl
6: end procedure
Finally, the authors provide a simple scheme which utilizes f , the above encoding/decoding procedure,
and an IND$-CPA public-key encryption scheme to achieve public-key steganographic encoding:
Algorithm 3 Public-key Steganographic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure encode(PK,m,h)
2: Set c = EncPK(m)
3: Return encode(c, h, k)
4: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Public-key Steganographic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure decode(SK,s = s1, ..., sl)
2: Set c = decode(s)
3: Return DecSK(c)
4: end procedure
As a final step, the authors of [4] discuss the prospect of steganographic key exchange protocols.
They provide a formal definition of steganographic key exchange correctness and secrecy in the case of
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asynchronous single-round exchange protocols, and they further give a single-round protocol which is
provably secure under the standard decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
The authors define a steganographic key exchange protocol (SKEP) is a quadruple of probabilistic
algorithms (SEA, SEB, SDA, SDB). SEA/B should take as input a security parameter and a source
of randomness and return as output a sequence of documents indistinguishable from C
l(k)
h for some
polynomial function l. SDx∈{A,B} takes as input a security parameter, a source of randomness rx, and a
sequence of documents and returns a key K ∈ {0,1}k. A SKEP is correct if
PrrA,rB [SDA(k, rA, SEB(k, rB)) = SDB(k, rB, SEA(k, rA))] ≥ 1 − µ(k)
where µk is a negligible function in k. A SKEP is considered secure if it is steganographically secret in
the same setting as that for chosen hidden-text security (except where indistinguishability is now between
keys as opposed to messages from the channel space).
2.1 Initial Thoughts and Questions
2.1.1 Restrictions Placed upon Channels
As pointed out in the report preceding this one, the formal definition of a channel given originally in [1]
suffers two potential flaws: (1) the reliance on fixed-size blocks and (2) strict minimum entropy require-
ments. The formulation of a channel given in [4] seems to address (1) by abstracting the channel as being
defined over a sequence of variable-length documents; however, (2) is still present in the requirement that
all channels be L-informative. With respect to (1), the issue itself may well not be completely eliminated,
as the authors in [4] require that channels fit requirements for some fixed-length of document sequences,
leading again to the same concerns regarding missing opportunities to exploit structural properties in the
channel to achieve higher rate.
The formal definition in [4] also presents new difficulty in defining security settings for steganography.
Since there is no mention or use of message length in this new formulation, there is technically no explicit
bound on the number of bits read by an adversary (with respect to sampling the channel); this leads to
difficulty in presenting precise descriptions of adversaries from a complexity-theoretic perspective. For
further discussion of these issues, please refer to sections 2.1.1 and 3.2 of the previous report, where they
are explored in detail and an alternate channel formulation (explicitly respecting complexity-theoretic
definitions of adversaries) is presented.
It is also important to note that the channel formulation in [4] eliminates the incorporation of mes-
sage/document parameters from [1], also eliminating the possibility of explicitly including (channel-
specific) side-channel considerations into the construction of schemes.
2.1.2 Necessity of Chosen Stegotext Security
While the definition of chosen stegotext secrecy is sound for the desired setting, I question the premise
on the grounds of necessity. To recap, the authors state that chosen hiddentext secrecy is defined with
respect to a setting in which Ward injects new or modified stegotexts into the communication stream from
Alice to Bob and then views hiddentexts output by Bob. Is there any useful or realistic steganographic
scenario in which Bob would ever output hiddentexts in response to secret messages passed by Alice? Is
there any way in which doing so would not provide anecdotal evidence of the use of steganography (or,
in fact, explicitly defeat the purpose of using steganography due to taking actions easily distinguishable
from the expected distribution Ch)?
I would pose that a public-key stegosystem would be sufficiently secure under (a) a guarantee of chosen
hiddentext secrecy, (b) a guarantee of chosen ciphertext securityIn line with the authors’ method of build-
ing stegosystems using existing public-key systems, this could be done by simply constructing a stegosystem
using a CCA2-secure public-key system., and (c) the use of (either the same or another) chosen-hiddentext
secret stegosystem to respond to hidden messages. (a) should guarantee that Ward remains unaware of
the use of steganography; (b) guarantees that private keys remain private among those aware of the use
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of steganography (thus allowing repudiation in the case that Ward can guess or influence hiddentexts);
(c) keeps communication secret in continuity (even when the second party responds). Another alter-
native could be to only use a public-key stegosystem only in an authentication step of an authenticated
steganographic key exchange protocol and then use the exchanged key to communicate using a private-key
stegosystem (which must be, of course, steganographically secret).
It is interesting to consider the sort of concern posed by the concept of chosen stegotext security: let’s
say that the adversaryW somehow learns Bob’s public key. W can now clearly submit stegotexts to Bob
or Alice without necessarily being sure that the two are using steganography, but neither may respond
(publicly) without confirming the suspicion of W . Extrapolating this scenario to a distributed system of
communicating parties, we see immediately a need for steganographic authentication, trust management,
and public-key infrastructure that guarantees secrecy as well as the standard guarantees of cryptographic
PKIs.
2.1.3 Public-key Steganography and the Random Oracle Model
It seems that we can actually relax the requirement of unbiased functions in the constructions of [4] to
obtain a result that random-indistinguishable public-key cryptography implies public-key steganography
in the random oracle model.
Rather than expect f to be an unbiased function over the support of Ch, we may simply view f as
a 1-bit random oracle over the support of polynomial-length document sequences. The generic encoding
and decoding procedures would then be as follows:
Algorithm 5 Basic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure encode(c1, ..., cl ∈ {0,1}l, h ∈ D∗, k)
2: for i = 1...l do
3: Set j = 0
4: while (j = 0ORf(g(s1, ..., si))! = ci)AND(j ≤ k) do
5: si ⇐ Ch
6: Increment j
7: end while
8: Set h = h ∣∣ si
9: end for
10: Return s1, ..., sl
11: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Basic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure decode(s1, ..., sl)
2: for i = 1...l do
3: Set ci = f(g(s1, ..., si))
4: end for
5: Return c1, ..., cl
6: end procedure
(Above, g(s1, ..., sj) corresponds to some function of a sequence of messages, perhaps g(s1, ..., sj) = j ∣∣ sj
or g(s1, ..., sj) = s1 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ sj .
Under this encoding scheme, in the case of a statistically uncharacterized channel, we can potentially
implement arbitrary public-key steganographic primitives by simply implementing f as any of the current
candidates (e.g. the first bit of SHA-3); for well-characterized (and well-structured) channels, we may rely
instead on some function f which is a genuinely unbiased function with respect tot he channel distribution.
Page 6
Steganography Project Report, Spring 2017
Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu)
2.1.4 Definition of Security for Steganographic Key Exchanges
The authors of [4] note that their definition of a steganographic key exchange (and definition of security)
is limited to the asynchronous, single-round case. It seems worthwhile to pursue a definition which suffices
for multi-round protocols. (I attempt to provide such a definition and security setting in a later section.)
3 Operate-Embed-Extract: A Stegosystem Design Paradigm
[4] and [1] respectively show the existence of private-key and public-key steganography in arbitrary chan-
nels meeting minimum entropy requirements. Both works provide multiple provably secret constructions
for steganographic equivalents of private-key and public-key encryption based upon different assumptions,
but, interestingly, each of these constructions (1) seems to intuitively fit into a common, unstated pattern
while (2) also somehow being excessively restrictive in their pursuit of ‘universal’ steganography to the
point of preventing use of channel-specific qualities for the sake of either efficiency or security.
In this section, I attempt to consolidate the common methods of the steganographic constructions of [4]
and [1] into a single abstract paradigm for stegosystem design. This paradigm, which I call operate-embed-
extract, serves to provide a systematic framework for designing and proving the security of stegosystems
both universally and for specific channels.
3.1 Paradigm Description
The operate-embed-extract paradigm is applicable to the design of constructions serving the purpose of
a steganographic objective. The steganographic objectives applicable to the paradigm are those which
may be stated as an equivalent cryptographic objective having the additioinal constraint that any output
produced must be indistinguishable from some channel distribution C.
A steganographic construction S in the operate-embed-extract paradigm is composed of at least two
probabilistic algorithms (S,S−1) which make use of three components: a set of external operations
Fext = {OPERATE′1(< rpublic, rprivate >, o), ...}, a set of internal operations Fint = {OPERATE(int)1 (<
rpublic, rprivate >, o), ...}, and two other functions, EMBED(C, h, t D),EXTRACT (C, h, c1, ..., cl(k)).
OPERATE(⋅, ⋅) ∈ Fext takes as input a source of public randomness, a source of private random-
ness, and an objective string o; OPERATE uses < rpublic, rprivate > to apply some transformation to
o and returns output d computationally indistinguishable from distribution D. All public OPERATE
functionalities must also guarantee the desired cryptographic properties of the construction.
OPERATE(⋅, ⋅) ∈ Fint is simply any function of a source of randomness and an objective string
o. These functions need not perform any specific purpose and are instead defined as needed by the
stegosystem.
EMBED takes as input a channel C, a history h, and an element t drawn from an input distribution
D and returns a sequence c1, ..., cl(k) from the support of Cl(k)h . EXTRACT takes as input a channel C,
a history h, and a sequence of covertexts c1, ..., cl(k) and returns a message from some message space.
A steganographic construction S = (T,T −1) in this paradigm using would then be structured as follows:
1: procedure T (h, rpublic, rprivate,m ∈M)
2: Some sequence of interleaved external and internal operations ∈ Fext and ∈ Fint, obtaining m
′.
3: m′′ = F (rpublic, rprivate,m′) for some F ∈ Fext returning m′′ from the support of D.
4: return EMBED(C, h,m′′)
5: end procedure
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1: procedure T −1(h, rpublic, rprivate,< c1, ..., cl(k) >)
2: m′′ = EXTRACT (C, h,< c1, ..., cl(k) >)
3: Some sequence of interleaved internal operations ∈ Fint, obtaining m from m
′′.
4: return m
5: end procedure
3.2 A Proof Framework for Steganographic Objectives
The operate-embed-extract paradigm also gives a simplified and streamlined proof framework for stegano-
graphic constructions, both those defined with respect to specific channels and with respect to those
defined universally.
I claim that, for any steganographic objective defined under the given paradigm, only the following
need be proved to prove security:
1. The output of EMBED(C, h, x) is indistinguishable from Cl(k)
h
when x is drawn according to D.
2. The final output of the last-invoked F ∈ Fext satisfies all necessary cryptographic objectives.
3. The final output of the last-invoked F ∈ Fext is indistinguishable from D.
(Note: the scheme must also be shown to be correct in order to be valid.)
Justification of this claim is simple: say that we prove that F satisfies all cryptographic requirements.
Now say that we prove that the output of F is indistinguishable from D. If we are using an EMBED(⋅, ⋅, ⋅)
which is indistinguishable from Cl(k)
h
given x ∼ D, then we have that EMBED(⋅, ⋅, F (⋅, ⋅)) is also indis-
tinguishable from Cl(k)
h
. Since the scheme (a) satisfies the necessary cryptographic requirements and (b)
is indistinguishable from the channel distribution, the scheme is secure under the given steganographic
secrecy setting.
3.2.1 Implications
There are two primary theoretical implications of this paradigm: (1) separation of the design of cryp-
tographic functionality from channel embedding and (2) the ability to adapt stegosystems proved to be
secure in a universal model in a channel-specific manner without affecting security.
With respect to (1), we see that this separation comes from the fact that Fint and Fext are not defined
with respect to a channel, whereas all channel-specific operations are exclusive to EMBED/EXTRACT .
Given a steganographic objective, then, we may design the procedures for Fext and Fint without any
concern given to the channel in which the stegosystem will be applied (instead shelving that concern for
the design of EMBED/EXTRACT ).
Moreover, this separation leads us to (2): by defining a universal EMBED/EXTRACT procedure for
a class of channel (or perhaps all of them), design of a sufficient Fint and Fext procedure for any objective
immediately yields a steganographically secure construction in all of those channels. Further, we retain
the freedom to later modify EMBED/EXTRACT (perhaps to achieve greater efficiency in the channel)
at a finer granularity at a later time without affecting security (so long as the modification obeys the
requirements of EMBED/EXTRACT , of course.)
There also exists a significant benefit from a systems/implementation standpoint: the modularity of
this framework increases the ease involved in implementing a diverse array of stegosystems, potentially
in shared channels. Fix a set of channels over which we plan to operate and a distribution D. We now
need only to implement EMBED/EXTRACT for these channels once, and then we may implement
any number of stegosystems for any number of steganographic objectives using these channels by simply
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implementing the proper Fpriv and Fpub procedures which utilize EMBED/EXTRACT . Use of such
a framework immediately bolsters the practical utility of STEG-MQ (allowing for things such as shared
channel steganography or even simply simple selection between different objectives).
3.3 A Pseudo-Universal EMBED/EXTRACT Procedure in the Random Or-
acle Model
As previously discussed, in the operate-embed-extract framework, design of a satisfactory Fint, Fext pro-
cedure immediately yields secure steganographic constructions for our objective in as many channels as
are covered by EMBED/EXTRACT . In this section, I re-frame an existing method described in [4] and
[1] to obtain an EMBED/EXTRACT procedure which applies to any channel having entropy bounded
from below by a constant (or, equivalently, maximum probability over any element of the support Ch
bounded from above by a constant).
Fix D to be the uniform distribution over binary strings of length p(k) (where k is the security
parameter). Assume the existence of a function f(C, h, x) which, given any C and h, acts as a random
oracle mapping x to {0,1} without bias (Pr[f(C, h, x) = 0] = 1
2
). Assume also that EMBED has access to
an oracle which allows it to sample from Ch for arbitrary histories h. Our EMBED/EXTRACT procedure
is as follows:
1: procedure EMBED(C, h, x U({0,1}p(k)))
2: for i = 1, ..., ∣x∣ do
3: t = 0
4: while t < k do
5: ci ⇐ C1h
6: if thenf(C, h, ci) = xi
7: break
8: end if
9: end while
10: h = h ∣∣ ci
11: end for
12: return c1, ...
13: end procedure
1: procedure EXTRACT (C, h,< c1, ..., cm >)
2: return m = f(C, h, c1) ∣∣ ... ∣∣ f(C, h ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cm−1, cm)
3: end procedure
3.3.1 Proof of Indistinguishability
The proof that the output of EMBED is indistinguishable from the channel distribution is direct. Let
C1, ...,Cm be random variables whose realizations are messages from the support of C⇒(m)h Let b1, ..., bm
be the bits of the input x to embed. Consider any individual Ci. The probability that Ci = c is precisely
the probability that c is drawn in a trial where f(c) = bi:
Pr[Ci = c ∣ bi] = PrCh[c]Pr[f(c) = bi]
Pr[bi]
=
PrCh[c]12
Pr[bi] (f acts as random oracle)
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We may similarly extend this statement to the complete output:
Pr[C1 = c1...Cm = cm ∣ b1...bm] =
Pr
C
⇒(m)
h
[c1, ..., cm]Pr[f(c1) = b1, ..., f(cm) = bm]
Pr[b1...bm]
=
Pr
C
⇒(m)
h
[c1, ..., cm]12
m
Pr[b1...bm] (f acts as random oracle)
We thus see that Pr[C1 = c1...Cm = cm ∣ b1...bm] is PrC⇒(m)
h
[C1 = c1...Cm = cm] when x is drawn
uniformly at random.
3.3.2 Note on Correctness
We note that, with negligible probability, the given EMBED/EXTRACT may be incorrect in one or more
bits. This negligibility, however, applies only to channels meeting a minimum entropy assumption: if at
any point the entropy of Ch∣∣...ci is not constant and > 0, the probability of failure is no longer necessarily
bounded by a negligible function.
3.3.3 An Entropy-Adaptive Universal EMBED/EXTRACT Procedure for Uncharacterized
Channels
We can further improve the utility of the previously given EMBED/EXTRACT procedure if we assume
that EXTRACT also has access to a channel oracle. This improvement is based on the following ob-
servation: if the entropy in the channel is too low for EMBED, then there will not exist a ci that may
feasibly be sampled such that f(ci) = bi.
In order to capitalize on this advantage, EMBED would function exactly as before, except before ac-
cepting a message from the support of the channel, it would verify that, within k iterations, it is able to
obtain ck cj such that one is mapped by f to 1 and one is mapped by f to 0. If this is possible, then it
performs as usual. If this is not possible, then EMBED just samples and uses any c from the support of
the channel, with the expectation that EXTRACT will be able to come to the conclusion that it should
skip it.
Likewise, EXTRACT would function exactly as before, except it would perform a similar check before
using the bit f(ci): it would verify that it is able to obtain ck, cj such that one is mapped by f to 1 and
one is mapped by f to 0 by the oracle. If this is not possible, it skips the current ci. If it is possible, then
it uses the current ci.
Note that the error probability for this scheme is now negligible, even for channels with entropy not
bounded by a constant: if the channel does have high entropy, then the probability that EMBED is not
able to obtain covertexts mapped to both 1 and 0 is negligible; if the channel has low entropy, then the
probability that EMBED is able to obtain such a pair is negligible. Similarly, if the channel has high
entropy, EXTRACT will err and skip a covertext only with negligible probability; if the channel has low
entropy, then the probability that EXTRACT attempts to decode using the ciphertext is negligible.
We note that, in a situation in which use of this EMBED/EXTRACT mechanism is necessary, it’s nearly
certain that any stegosystem utilizing it will achieve only a low rate rate (very few covertexts may be
usable) of hidden information. The existence of this strategy, however, does enable a few fringe use cases
that may potentially prove useful, and it extends the scope of our ‘universal’ approach to steganography.
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4 Multi-channel (Distributed) Steganography: Achieving a New
Steganographic Security Objective using Operate-Embed-Extract
Work exists [3] which attempts to ‘increase’ secrecy by effectively splitting messages between multiple
mediums. When this method is suggested, the intuitive motivation seems to be that splitting messages
between mediums somehow decreases the chance of detection. In the specific case of [3], the authors
attempt to work towards a formal model which ultimately (a) relies on methods known to be vulnerable
(specifically LSB steganography in images) and (b) does not generalize to other channels. Ignoring
the oversights of previous work, however, distributed steganography seems to be an interesting task in
that it may allow us to develop systems which use the knowledge/accessibility of elements of a general
‘environment’ to provide security guarantees.
In this section, I broadly explore a formal basis for such a distributed form of steganography. Specif-
ically, I (1) provide a formal definition of a distributed stegosystem, (2) provide two equivalent security
settings for the provable security of a distributed stegosystem, and (3) provide a provably secret construc-
tions for these settings. Furthermore, I demonstrate the utility of the operate-embed-extract paradigm by
using it to design these constructions.
4.1 Notation
This section makes use of non-standard notation for the sake of ease of exposition. Let A be a set of
ordered element-tuple pairs of the form A = {(x1,< e(1)1 , ... >), (xm,< e(m)1 , ... >)}. Let B be a set of
elements B = {xi1 , ..., xik}. We define A < B > as
A < B >= {(xa,< e(a)1 , ... >) ∣ (xa,< e(a)1 , ... >) ∈ A,xa ∈ B}
4.2 A Formal Definition of Distributed Stegosystems
We define the environment of a distributed stegosystem be a set [C] = {C(1), ...,C(w)} of channels in
which it operates.
A distributed stegosystem is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (DSE,DSD).
DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m ∈ {0,1}l(k), e) takes as input a source of randomness r, a target environment
[C]t ⊆ [C] = {T1, ...,Tt}, a set of histories [h]t = {h1, ...ht} (where hi is the history of channel Ti ∈ [C]t)), a
message to hidem (having length polynomial in k, the security parameter), and a threshold e ≤ t specifying
the minimum number of channels that must be accessible to recover m; DSE(⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅) returns a set of
covertext sequences, one for each channel in the target environment, {(T1,< c(1)1 , ... >), ..., (Tt,< c(t)1 , ... >)}.
DSD([C]s, [h]s,{(S1,< c(1)1 , ... >), ..., (Ss,< c(s)1 , ... >)}) takes as input a visible environment [C]s ⊆
[C] = {S1, ...,Ss}, a set of histories [h]s = {h1, ..., hs} (where hi is the history of channel Si), and a set of
covertext sequences, one for each channel in the seen environment; DSD(⋅, ⋅, ⋅) returns a message {0,1}l(k).
4.2.1 Correctness of Distributed Stegosystems
A distributed stegosystem is considered correct if, for all input configurations satisfying e ≥ 1, ∣[C]s∣ ≥ e,
[C]s ⊆ [C]t, [h]s ⊆ [h]t,
Prr[DSD([C]s, [h]s,DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m, e) < C]s >) =m] ≥ 1 − µ(k)
for some negligible function µ(k).
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4.2.2 Security Setting: Open-Access Distributional Secrecy against Chosen Hiddentext
Attacks
We provide a notion of security for distributed stegosystems called open-access distributional secrecy
against chosen hiddentext attacks (OA-DS-CHA). This setting is chosen to model attempted detection
by an adversary in a chosen environment where not all communication channels visible to Alice and Bob
are visible to the Warden at any given point in time. In this setting, channels are considered open-
access, meaning visibility of cover messages is the only requirement to recover steganographically hidden
information. Security in this setting is desirable for participants Alice and Bob who believe that there
exists a threshold number of channels visible to the Warden at the time of attempted detection but who
for some reason cannot establish a pre-shared secret.
We define this setting as the following game played by a wardenW in an environment [C] = {C(1), ...,C(w)}:
1. W is given oracles O1, ...,Ow capable of sampling from channels C1, ...,Cw for arbitrary histories h.
2. W is given query access to DSE(⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅).
3. W generates a challenge set consisting of a target environment [C]t (t ≥ 1), a corresponding set of
histories [h]t, a message ∈ {0,1}l(k), and a threshold e ≥ 1.
4. W chooses a visible subset of the environment [C]s of size e − 1.
5. W is then given one of
(a) Q1: DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m, e) < [C]s > for privately chosen (and unknown) randomness r, or
(b) Q0: {(S1,< ... >∼ Sp(k)hs1 ), ..., (Ss,< ... >∼ S
p(k)
hss
)}
6. W is given query access to DSE(⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅) once more.
7. W outputs a guess: 1 if he believes he was given Q1, else 0.
We define the advantage of a warden W as the quantity
Adv(W ) = ∣Prr[W (Q1)⇒ 1] − Prr[W (Q0)⇒ 0]∣
A distributed stegosystem S = (DSE,DSD) is DS −CHA secure in environment [C] if the advantage of
any probabilistic polynomial-time warden is negligible in the security parameter of the system.
By nature of the definition of DS-CHA security, a system is DS-CHA secure if and only if covertexts
produced by the system are computationally indistinguishable from benign covertexts in visible subsets
of the environment not meeting the specified size threshold e.
4.2.3 Security Setting: Key-Restricted Distributional Secrecy against Chosen Hiddentext
Attacks
We also provide a stronger notion of security for distributed stegosystems called key-restricted distribu-
tional secrecy against chosen hiddentext attacks (KR-DS-CHA). This setting is chosen to model detection
by an adversary in a chosen environment where the adversary may see all channels but may recover
steganographically hidden information in some (but not all) channels. Channels in this model are key-
restricted, meaning that both visibility and key knowledge are required to recover steganographically
hidden information from any given channel. Security in this setting is desirable for participants Alice
and Bob who believe that there exists a threshold number of channel keys which may be leaked to the
adversary.
KR-DS-CHA security applies to families of distributed stegosystems indexed by a key vector, (DSEK¯ ,DSDK¯),
K¯ ∈ {0,1}kw. We define this setting as the following game played by a warden W in an environment
[C] = {C(1), ...,C(w)} with associated channel keys [K] = {K(C1), ...,KCw)}.
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1. W is given oracles O1, ...,Ow capable of sampling from channels C1, ...,Cw for arbitrary histories h.
2. W is given query access to DSEK¯(⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅).
3. W generates a challenge set consisting of a target environment [C]t (t ≥ 1), a corresponding set of
histories [h]t, a message ∈ {0,1}l(k), and a threshold e ≥ 1.
4. W is then given one of
(a) Q1: DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m, e) for privately chosen (and unknown) randomness r, or
(b) Q0: {(C1,< ... >∼ Cp(k)1,h1 ), ..., (Cw,< ... >∼ C
p(k)
w,hw
)}
5. W chooses a subset of channels [C]s of size e − 1.
6. W receives the e − 1 keys corresponding to the channels in [C]s.
7. W is given query access to DSEK¯(⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅) once more.
8. W outputs a guess: 1 if he believes he was given Q1, else 0.
4.3 An OA-DS-CHA-secret Distributed Stegosystem
In this section, we provide an OA-DS-CHA-secret distributed stegosystem using the operate-embed-extract
stegosystem design framework. This scheme uses a modified variant of Shamir Secret Sharing, and the
key mechanism used is interpolation.
The public parameters of this system are as follows:
1. A field Fq for q ≥ 2
k (where k is the security parameter), say GF (2k). (We could also use a prime
field, but we would then need to also augment this scheme with something like Young and Yung’s
probabilistic bias removal method [5].)
This scheme also makes use of the following set of internal functions
Fint = {P,SecretGen(r), PolyGen(r, e), PointGen(r, t), Interpolate(L, e)}. P is a pseudorandom permu-
tation, and the rest are defined as follows:
Algorithm 7 SecretGen Procedure
1: procedure SecretGen(r)
2: return random secret T ∈ {0,1}k.
3: end procedure
Algorithm 8 PolyGen
1: procedure PolyGen(r, e)
2: Choose vector a⃗i composed of e − 1 values chosen uniformly at random from {0,1}k.
3: Choose another vector b⃗i composed of e − 1 values chosen uniformly at random from {0,1}k.
4: return a⃗i, b⃗i
5: end procedure
Algorithm 9 PointGen
1: procedure PointGen(r, t)
2: Choose random sequence x⃗ of t values uniformly at random from {0,1}k without replacement.
3: return x⃗
4: end procedure
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Algorithm 10 Interpolate (Lagrange interpolation to recover constant)
1: procedure Interpolate(L = {(x1, f(x1)) ∣ ∀i = 1...e}, e)
2: return ∑ei=1 f(xi)∏ej=1≠i xjxj−xi
3: end procedure
Our scheme also makes use of a single external function, Fext = {EvaluatePoint(a⃗i, x)}.
Algorithm 11 EvaluatePoint
1: procedure EvaluatePoint(p0, a⃗i, x)
2: return x ∣∣ (p0 +∑∣a⃗i∣i=1 xiai)
3: end procedure
Our scheme is thus the following (we note that all uses of randomness source r are fresh; i.e., after one
function uses random bits drawn from r, r supplies the next with fresh bits):
Algorithm 12 Distributed Steganographic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m ∈ {0,1}k,1 ≤ e ≤ t)
2: Set K = SecretGen(r).
3: Set a⃗i, b⃗i = PolyGen(r, e).
4: Set X =< xi >= PointGen(r, t).
5: Set m˜ = PK(m).
6: for i from 1 to t do
7: Take xi ∣∣ yi ∣∣ y˜i as EvaluatePoint(K, a⃗i, xi) ∣∣ EvaluatePoint(m˜, b⃗i, xi)y
8: Set c(i) = EMBED(Ci, hi, xi ∣∣ yi ∣∣ zi ∣∣ y˜i).
9: end for
10: return {(Ci,< c(i) >) ∣ ∀ = 1...t}
11: end procedure
Algorithm 13 Distributed Steganographic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure DSD([C]s, [h]s,{(S1,< c(1) >), ..., (Ss,< c(s) >)})
2: for i from 1 to s do
3: Take xi ∣∣ yi ∣∣ y˜i as EXTRACT (Si, hi, c(i)).
4: Take as a point (xi, yi = f(xi)) and append it to L1.
5: Take as a point (xi, y˜i = g(xi)) and append it to L2.
6: end for
7: Set K = Interpolate(L1, e).
8: Set m˜ = Interpolate(L2, e).
9: return P −1K (m˜).
10: end procedure
Correctness follows directly from the correctness of Lagrange interpolation (for the first coefficient of
a polynomial).
4.3.1 Proof of Secrecy
Motivation for the Proof Structure We give a proof of secrecy under the operate-embed extract paradigm
in order to show the utility of the proof framework it admits. To review, in section 3.1.3, we claimed
the following is sufficient to prove the security of an operate-embed-extract-amenable steganographic
objective:
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1. The output of EMBED(C, h, x) is indistinguishable from Cl(k)
h
when x is drawn according to D.
2. The final output of the last-invoked F ∈ Fext satisfies all necessary cryptographic objectives.
3. The final output of the last-invoked F ∈ Fext is indistinguishable from D.
To illustrate how we will proceed in our proof, consider an open-access distributed steganographical
scheme for which there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time warden achieving non-negligible advantage
in the OA-DS-CHA security game. Then it is necessarily the case that, when playing against this scheme,
the warden is able to distinguish between steganographically hidden messages and messages drawn from
the benign channel distribution.
Consider now the more specific case of a scheme designed using operate-embed-extract. Then it is
necessarily the case that the compiled output of EMBED(C, h, x) in the e − 1 selected channels is dis-
tinguishable from Cl(k)
h
. It must then be the case that either (a) required property 1 does not hold
or that (b) required property 1 does hold but that the components hidden are not drawn accord-
ing to distribution D. Therefore, in the case of proving OA − DS − CHA secrecy, it is sufficient to
prove that both property 1 holds for all channels and that property 3 holds for the compiled output of
EvaluatePoint(K, a⃗i, xi) ∣∣ EvaluatePoint(m˜, b⃗i, zi) in the e − 1 channels visible to the adversary. In the
specific case of OA-DS-CHA secrecy, only properties 1 and 3 need to be proved.
Proof The given scheme satisfies property 1: it assumes the use of canonical EMBED/EXTRACT
procedures for all concerned channels where D is fixed to the uniform distribution over binary strings
of length k. As for property 3, view the inputs to the final external function of DSE in the individual
channels of [C]s in DSE (arbitrarily ordering them as 1...s) as the following matrix S:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1 y1 yˆ1
. . . . . . . . . . .
xs ys yˆs
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The columns of S may be interpreted as follows: column 1, X = (x1, ..., xs), is a sequence of x-
coordinates of points hiding K; column 2, Y = (y1, ..., ys), is the sequence of y-coordinates of points
hiding K ((xi, yi) is a complete share of K); column 3, Yˆ = (yˆ1, ..., yˆs), is the sequence of x-coordinates of
points hiding PK(m) (xˆi, yˆi) is a complete share of PK(m)).
As stated, property 3 is satisfied if and only if the distribution overX ∣∣ Y ∣∣ Yˆ is indistinguishable from
the uniform random distribution over binary strings of length 3sk. Consider first only the distribution of
X = x1, ..., xs.
Claim 1 The distribution of X and the uniform distribution Xu over binary strings of length sk are
statistically indistinguishable (with respect to the security parameter k).
For any element in the support of Xu, partition it into a sequence of s substrings of length k as we
do with X . Since each xs is some subset of x
′
1
, ..., x′t chosen uniformly at random without replacement,
we have
Pr[X = x1, ..., xs] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 ∃i ≠ j, xi = xj
a, 1
2ks
< a ≤ 1
(2k−t)s
else
Assuming t (the number of channels in which information will be hidden) is polynomial in k, we have
Pr[X = x1, ..., xs] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 ∃i ≠ j, xi = xj
a, 1
2sk
< a < 1
2s(k−1)
else
Consider now the statistical distance between X and Xu the uniform distribution over binary strings of
length ks.
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∆(X,Xu) = sup
x1,...,xs∈{0,1}sk
(∣Pr[X = x1, ..., xs] −Pr[Xu = x1, ..., xs]∣)
=max( 1
2ks
,
1
2s(k−1)
−
1
2ks
)
≤
1
2s(k−1)
= µ(k)
As the statistical distance between X and Xu is negligible in k, we conclude that X and Xu are statisti-
cally indistinguishable. ∎
Claim 2 The distribution of Y and the uniform distribution Yu over binary strings of length sk are
statistically indistinguishable.
For any element in the support of Yu, partition it into a sequence of s substrings of length k as we
do with Y . Note that, for Y , any yi is equal to L(xi) = (a0 + ∑∣a⃗i ∣i=1 xiai), and so Y is determined by
the randomly chosen a0, ..., as=e−1 and X . We first look at the probability of observing any string Y
conditioned upon a specific observation of X :
Pra0,...,as=e−1[Y = y1, ..., ys ∣X = x1, ..., xs]
Fix a0. Note that, given any pairwise distinct X = x1, ..., xs, it is possible to observe y1, ..., ys: simply take
L as the degree-s polynomial fitting (0, a0), (x1, y1), ..., (xs, ys). But (for a0 fixed) a1, ..., as determine
the curve L. Since there are 2sk possible curves and 2sk possible realizations of Y , there must exist a
one-to-one correspondence between a1, ..., as and y1, ..., ys given x1, ..., xs. Thus,
Pra1,...,as=e−1[Y = y1, ..., ys ∣X = x1, ..., xs ∧ a0 = p0] = Pr[a1, ..., as ∼ {0,1}sk]
=
1
2sk
Now remove the restriction on a0.
Pra0,a1,...,as=e−1[Y = y1, ..., ys ∣X = x1, ..., xs] = ∑
p∈{0,1}k
Pr[a0 = p]Pr[a1, ..., as ∼ {0,1}sk]
= ∑
p∈{0,1}k
1
2k
Pr[a1, ..., as ∼ {0,1}sk]
=
1
2sk
The above shows that, in fact, Y and X are independent. Further, it gives us that the distribution of
Y is equivalent to the distribution Yu (the statistical distance is 0). Thus we have that Y and Yu are
statistically indistinguishable. ∎.
Claim 3 X ∣∣ Y ∣∣ Yˆ is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform random distribution over
binary strings of length 3sk.
Claim 1 and claim 2 give us that X ∣∣ Y is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform random
distribution over binary strings of length 2sk (else we reach contradiction). Similarly, if we assume that
m˜ is truly random, we may apply exactly the same argument to X ∣∣ Yˆ . In truth, m˜ is computationally
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indistinguishable from random (by nature of PK chosen as a pseudo-random permutation and K chosen
randomly). We thus have that, if we may distinguish Xˆ ∣∣ Yˆ from random, we may distinguish m˜ from
random with precisely the same advantage by direct reduction. By our choice of PK , we thus conclude that
Xˆ ∣∣ Yˆ is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over strings of length 2sk (and
where the advantage of an adversary is bounded by the maximum random indistinguishability advantage
of an adversary against PK).
Since X ∣∣ Y is statistically indistinguishable from random, and since X ∣∣ Yˆ is computationally indis-
tinguishable from random, we are able to conclude that X ∣∣ Y ∣∣ Yˆ is computationally indistinguishable
from the uniform random distribution over binary strings of length 3sk. ∎.
Claim 3 gives us that property 3 is satisfied. As we have already shown that property 1 is satisfied,
we conclude that the given distributed stegosystem is OA-DS-CHA-secret. ◻
4.3.2 Secrecy for Variable-Length Messages Hidden in a Distributed Manner
Note that, for a single-block message m, our analysis shows that we may simply directly hide m (setting
a0 = m) and achieve the same security. In the case of our system, we instead hide a random key K and
the encrpted message m: the utility of doing so presents itself when we make practical considerations.
In particular, by means of the indirection K provides, we may achieve a stronger notion of secrecy for
variable-length messages: if the PRP P is applied in a cipher mode offering both forward and backward
diffusion, a warden requires access to all message blocks in e channels in order to recover anything about
the original m. In contrast, if we blindly hide just m, the adversary requires access to only one hidden
message block in e channels to leak information about m.
4.3.3 An Alternative Distributed Stegosystem using Channel Identification
In this section, we provide a modified version of the previously discussed distributed stegosystem. This
stegosystem reduces the amount of information which must be published in channels at the cost of an
increase in the amount of public knowledge needed to encode and decode messages.
The public parameters of such a system are as follows:
1. A field Fq for q ≥ 2
k (where k is the security parameter), say GF (2k).
2. A unique element of Fq ICi for each channel Ci ∈ [C]w. We call ICi the identifier of Ci.
Using precisely the same internal functions, external functions, and embedding procedure as before,
we give (DSD,DSE) as follows:
Algorithm 14 Distributed Steganographic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m ∈ {0,1}k,1 ≤ e ≤ t)
2: Set K = SecretGen(r).
3: Set a⃗i, b⃗i = PolyGen(r, e).
4: Set X =< xi >=< ICi∈[C]t ∣ ∀i = 1 up to t >.
5: Set Z =< zi >=< ICi∈[C]t ∣ ∀i = 1 up to t >.
6: Set m˜ = PK(m).
7: for i from 1 to t do
8: Take yi ∣∣ y˜i as EvaluatePoint(K, a⃗i, xi)y ∣∣ EvaluatePoint(m˜, b⃗i, zi)y
9: Set c(i) = EMBED(Ci, hi, yi ∣∣ y˜i).
10: end for
11: return {(Ci,< c(i) >) ∣ ∀ = 1...t}
12: end procedure
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Algorithm 15 Distributed Steganographic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure DSD([C]s, [h]s,{(S1,< c(1) >), ..., (Ss,< c(s) >)})
2: for i from 1 to s do
3: Take yi ∣∣ y˜i as EXTRACT (Si, hi, c(i)).
4: Take as a point (ISi , yi = f(xi)) and append it to L1.
5: Take as a point (ISi , y˜i = g(zi)) and append it to L2.
6: end for
7: Set K = Interpolate(L1, e).
8: Set m˜ = Interpolate(L2, e).
9: return P −1K (m˜).
10: end procedure
This scheme essentially replaces each channel’s randomly-chosen x-coordinate with its identifier. Consider
this scheme in the context of the OA-DS-CHA secrecy game. In claim 2 of our proof of secrecy of the
previous scheme, we established that
Pra0,a1,...,as=e−1[Y = y1, ..., ys ∣X = x1, ..., xs] = 2−sk
for pairwise distinct x1, ..., xs, meaning that the collection of yi are distributed according to the uniform
random distribution. Likewise, in claim 3 of our proof of secrecy, we showed that (again, for pairwise
distinct x1, ..., xs), the collection of yˆi is computationally indistinguishable from random (as a result of the
random appearance of PK). Given a proper embed-extract procedure, the OA-DS-CHA secrecy of this
modified scheme thus follows directly given that we have shown that inputs are indistinguishable from
random.
Discussion This modified scheme certainly offers direct advantages: we only need to publish 2k bits
per channel (as opposed to 3k), and we don’t have to worry at all about selecting x-coordinates. On the
other hand, this scheme raises some new concerns. For example,
• The requirement that identifiers places a hard limit on the number of channels in the environment.
• Required knowledge of channel identifiersmay limit the number of channels with which a participant
may interact.
In truth, the first is not a practical concern. If we set k large enough, we would have enough unique
identifiers available to name all of the atoms in the visible universe. The second, however, is not so directly
addressed. If we choose channel identifiers naively, a participant may need to store k bits per channel with
which he or she will interact. We may combat this issue in practice by choosing identification schemes on
a per-environment basis which allow identification without storage.
For the sake of illustration, say that we wish to deploy distributed steganography in an environment
composed entirely of TCP communication between hosts. A simple channel identification scheme that
does not require per-channel storage would be as follows: denote the duplex TCP channel between host
A having 32-bit IP-address R and host B having 32-bit IP-address S by the identifier R ∣∣ S.
Note that the above is a solution only for a very specific, contrived sort of environment. It does not
directly generalize to arbitrary environments. Creating a truly universal approach is especially challenging,
as a single identifier collision compromises the security of the given scheme. We give some potential ideas
for how to achieve ‘more universal’ channel identification:
• For physically visible channels, we may be able to use things like physical appearance to achieve
channel verification. For example, we might be able to achieve unique identification using, say,
pictures and locality sensitive hashing.
• If we have oracle access to all of our channels for arbitrary histories, and if underlying channel
distributions have non-negligible statistical distance between them, we may use a form of distribution
estimation to derive unique identifiers.
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4.4 Relationship between KR-DS-CHA Secrecy and OA-DS-CHA Secrecy
In this section, we explore the relationship between KR-DS-CHA secrecy and OA-DS-CHA secrecy. In
particular, we show that the existence of an OA-DS-CHA-secret distributed stegosystem with specific
properties implies the existence of a KR-DS-CHA stegosystem. We also show that the existence of a
KR-DS-CHA stegosystem which uses random keys implies the existence of an OA-DS-CHA stegosystem.
4.4.1 Constructing a KR-DS-CHA System from an OA-DS-CHA System
We show that the existence of an OA-DS-CHA-secure distributed stegosystem following the operate-
embed-extract paradigm with D fixed to the uniform distribution implies the existence of a KR-DS-CHA-
secret distributed stegosystem.
Assume that we have such a OA-DS-CHA-secret system S = (DSE,DSD). Because S is an operate-
embed-extract stegosystem, it will have the structure
Algorithm 16 Distributed Steganographic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m ∈ {0,1}k,1 ≤ e ≤ t)
2: (Interleaved operations from Fint.)
3: for i from 1 to t do
4: qi = Fext(...).
5: Set c(i) = EMBED(Ci, hi, qi).
6: end for
7: return {(Ci,< c(i) >) ∣ ∀ = 1...t}
8: end procedure
Algorithm 17 Distributed Steganographic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure DSD([C]s, [h]s,{(S1,< c(1) >), ..., (Ss,< c(s) >)})
2: for i from 1 to s do
3: Take qi as EXTRACT (Si, hi, c(i)).
4: end for
5: Set m = interleaved operations from Fint, operating on all q1, ..., qs.
6: return m.
7: end procedure
We obtain a KR-DS-CHA-secret system S′ as follows: augment S to add a key generation procedure
which takes as a parameter 1k and which assigns to each channel Ci ∈ [C]w a key KCi drawn uniformly at
random from {0,1}k. Next, use any pseudo-random permutation P (selected also according to security
parameter k) and modify DSD and DSE:
Algorithm 18 Distributed Steganographic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure DSE(r, [C]t, [h]t,m ∈ {0,1}k,1 ≤ e ≤ t)
2: (Interleaved operations from Fint.)
3: for i from 1 to t do
4: qi = Fext(...).
5: q′i = PKCi (qi).
6: Set c(i) = EMBED(Ci, hi, q′i).
7: end for
8: return {(Ci,< c(i) >) ∣ ∀ = 1...t}
9: end procedure
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Algorithm 19 Distributed Steganographic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure DSD([C]s, [h]s,{(S1,< c(1) >), ..., (Ss,< c(s) >)})
2: for i from 1 to s do
3: Take q′i as EXTRACT (Si, hi, c(i)).
4: Take qi = P
−1
KSi
(q′i).
5: end for
6: Set m = interleaved operations from Fint, operating on all q1, ..., qs.
7: return m.
8: end procedure
Security of S’ Any adversary against S′ in the KR-DS-CHA-security game must distinguish between
the benign covertext distribution and the output of DSE in the chosen channels. By the PRF security
of P , before W receives the e − 1 chosen keys, all q′i are computationally indistinguishable from random.
Therefore, for any channel for which W does not know the key, the output of DSE is indistinguishable
from the covertext distribution by choice of EMBED.
Consider now the point whenW receives access to the e−1 chosen keys. In the case that Q corresponds
to the output of DSE, W then obtains knowledge of a collection of qi for e − 1 channels; by the OA-
DS-CHA secrecy of S (for S designed using OEE, D fixed to the uniform distribution), these qi are
distributed according to the uniform distribution. In the case that Q corresponds to the benign covertext
distributions of the environment, each apparent qˆ′i is distributed exactly according to D (in our case, the
uniform distribution); applying P −1 to these qˆ′i yields a collection of qˆi which are random. We thus have
that the apparent qi, the only information gained by the release of keys, does not differentiate between
Q0 and Q1 except with negligible probability.
We thus conclude the KR-DS-CHA secrecy of S′ as a result of the PRF secrecy of P and the original
OA-DS-CHA secrecy of S.
4.4.2 Constructing an OA-DS-CHA System from a KR-DS-CHA System
We now show that the existence of a KR-DS-CHA-secret distributed stegosystem with keys chosen uni-
formly at random implies the existence of an OA-DS-CHA-secure distributed stegosystem.
Say we have such a KR-DS-CHA-secret distributed stegosystem S = (DSE,DSD). We may directly
construct an OA-DS-CHA-secret system S′ = (DSE′,DSD′) as so:
Algorithm 20 Distributed Steganographic Encoding Procedure
1: procedure DSE′(r, [C]t, [h]t,m ∈ {0,1}k,1 ≤ e ≤ t)
2: Run the key generation procedure for the channels in [C]t.
3: Publish each key in its respective channel using EMBED; update the histories [h]′t to reflect this.
4: Execute and return from DSEK⃗(r, [C]t, [h]′t,m ∈ {0,1}k,1 ≤ e ≤ t).
5: end procedure
Algorithm 21 Distributed Steganographic Decoding Procedure
1: procedure DSD′([C]s, [h]s,{(S1,< c(1) >), ..., (Ss,< c(s) >)})
2: Recover the keys for the channels in [C]s using EXTRACT on {(S1,< c(1) >), ..., (Ss,< c(s) >)}.
3: Move the portion of the covertexts c(1)...c(s) used to recover keys into the histories [h]s, obtaining
4: [h]′s and c(1)
′
...c(s)
′
.
5: Execute and return from DSDK⃗([C]s, [h]′s,{(S1,< c(1)
′
>), ..., (Ss,< c(s)′ >)}).
6: end procedure
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Security of S’ The security of S′ follows directly from the KR-DS-CHA security of S. The visible
channels in the OA-DS-CHA secrecy game correspond exactly to the keys released in the KR-DS-CHA
secrecy game.
5 Alternative Assumptions for Public-key Steganographic Key
Exchange
The authors of [4] define the notion of a steganographic key exchange, and they give only a single construc-
tion based on the standard Diffie-Hellman assumption and Yung’s method of probabilistic bias removal.
In this section, we present additional steganographic key exchange protocols based upon different as-
sumptions. In particular, we give a steganographic key exchange protocol based upon elliptic curve Diffie
Hellman, demonstrating that, with only minor changes, standard cryptographic key exchanges may be
converted to secure steganographic key exchanges. We additionally demonstrate that there indeed exist
key exchange protocols which may be applied in a black-box fashion under the operate-embed-extract
framework to obtain analogous exchanges in the cryptographic sense: specifically, we show that a di-
rect black box OEE application of the RLWE key exchange of Ding et. al. [2] yields a quantum-safe
steganographic key exchange which is secret under the decisional ring learning with errors assumption.
5.1 Defining Security for Steganographic Protocols
Before presenting these key exchange protocols, I would like to address a difficulty presented in [4], namely
the formal security setting given for steganographic key exchanges. The setting the authors give is clearly
sufficient for proving the security of such an exchange, but it does so by side-stepping the fact that a
key exchange protocol is, more generally, a type of two-party protocol. By defining a key exchange as
a quadruple of algorithms over the same channel, we miss an opportunity to obtain some definition of
security for general protocols.
Define now our own definition of a steganographic protocol. A steganographic protocol is a concrete
communications protocol coordinating steganographic primitives in order to achieve a steganographic ob-
jective. A steganographic protocol is executed between n parties P1, ..., Pn, each communicating via (not
necessarily distinct) channels C1, ...,Cn with an initial set of globally accessible channel histories h1, ..., hn.
As parties execute the protocol, they publish messages on some subset of channels (updating the histories
of the channel while doing so) until protocol execution is complete and the protocol produces some set of
zero or more products. The execution of a steganogaphic protocol results in a transcript τ composed of
the history of each concerned channel before and after each discrete event during protocol execution.
With respect to the security of a steganographic protocol, we may think either in the interactive or
non-interactive senses. The warden’s task in either case is to (a) attempt to distinguish between a proto-
col transcript τ or a benign channel transcript τ ′ composed of ordinary channel messages or (b) attempt
to distinguish one or more products (defined by the protocol); a protocol is secure if no warden is able
to successfully do either except with negligible probability. While a non-interactive warden attempts to
perform this task given only a transcript, an interactive warden is able to modify channel messages as
they are published.
Applying this definition to steganographic key exchange, we view a steganographic key exchange as a
two-party steganographic protocol whose single product is a shared key. In this section (as in [4]), we
present steganographic key exchange protocols secure in the non-interactive sense. (And shelf discussion
of the interactive section for the final section of this report.)
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5.2 Elliptic Curve Steganography
The first steganographic key establishment protocol we give is a rather direct one based upon the ellip-
tic curve Diffie-Hellman assumption; we design it using the OEE paradigm. Existing elliptic curve key
exchange protocols are themselves insufficient because they assume that it is valid to convey points on a
public curve in the clear; however, this is not necessarily true for a covert communication protocol because
simply the fact that the bits conveyed satisfy a curve equation is enough to inspire suspicion. As such,
the modification we provide is simple and minor (namely, we simply show that it suffices to convey only
the x coordinates of points) but necessary for our purposes.
The protocol Let party A be the protocol initiator. Let B be the responder. Choose the following
as public protocol parameters:
• Two public channels CA and CB, respectively the channels to be used by A and B. We also assume
public knowledge of h
(i)
A and h
(i)
B , respecitvely the channel histories of channel A and channel B
after the ith message is transmitted in the protocol.
• A valid EMBED/EXTRACT scheme for both CA and CB with the target input distribution D
chosen the uniform distribution over binary strings of length r.
• Secure curve parameters (f, a, b,G,n,h) for a binary field over GF (2r), r ≥ k + 5, where k is the
security parameter. As usual, choose the generator G such that the cofactor is small, say h ≤ 4.
The role of A (initiator) in the protocol is executed as follows:
1. Choose a ∈ [1, ..., n − 1] uniformly at random.
2. Obtain curve point (xA, yA) = aG.
3. Publish uˆ = EMBED(CA, h(0)A , xA) in channel CA, updating public channel histories to h(1)A and
h
(1)
B .
4. Receive vˆ = EMBED(CB, h(1)B , xB) on channel CB.
5. Obtain xB = EXTRACT (CB, h(1)B , vˆ).
6. Solve the quadratic equation y2B = x
3
B + axB + c in the chosen field GF (2r). Explicitly, yB =
(x3B + axB + b)2
r−1
.
7. Obtain curve point (xK , yK) = a(xB, yB), and take xK as the shared key.
The role of B (responder) in the protocol is executed as
1. Choose d ∈ [1, ..., n − 1] uniformly at random.
2. Obtain curve point (xB, yB) = dG.
3. Receive uˆ = EMBED(CA, h(0)A , xA) on channel CA.
4. Publish vˆ = EMBED(CB, h(1)B , xB) in channel CB, updating public channel histories to h(2)A and
h
(2)
B
.
5. Obtain xA = EXTRACT (CA, h(0)A , uˆ).
6. Solve the quadratic equation y2A = x
3
A + axA + c in the chosen field GF (2r). Explicitly, yA = (x3A +
axA + b)2r−1 .
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7. Obtain the curve point (xK , yK) = d(xA, yB).
Proof of correctness We prove that, at the end of protocol execution, both A and B have knowledge
of xK , the protocol product. This proof makes use of the following fact:
Fact 1 (F1): Every quadratic equation of the form y2 = w has a unique solution in GF (2r).
We briefly note that this fact follows from the property that every element in GF (2r) is a quadratic
residue. Consider any q ∈ GF (2r) and p = q2r−1 . p2 = (q2r−1)2 = q2∗2r−1 = q2r . Since GF (2r) is cyclic,
order 2r, p2 = q. Since the function f(q) = √q = q2r−1 is defined for all of q, and since it is invertible
( f−1(t) = t2), f(q) = √q is a bijection; thus, solutions to equations of the form y2 = b have a unique
solution given by f(b).∎.
Consider now the given steganographic key exchange protocol. By the correctness of EMBED/EXTRACT ,
we know that A is able to obtain xB and that B is able to obtain xA. By F1, we have that A is able to
derive yB = (x3B + axB + b)2
r−1
, thus obtaining B’s chosen point (xB , yB). By F1, we also have that B is
able to derive yA = (x3A + axA + b)2
r−1
, obtaining A’s choen point (xA, yA). In the final step, A obtains
a(xB, yB) = adG, and B obtains d(xA, yA) = daG. By the commutivity of point multiplication in elliptic
curve groups, (xK , yK) = adG = daG, and so B and A agree on xK .
Proof of security We show that messages exchanged in the protocol transcript τ are indistinguish-
able from the underlying channel distributions. Because we are operating in the OEE framework, and
because messages exchanged hide only the x coordinates xA and xB , it is sufficient to show that xA and
xB are indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over binary strings of length r. Moreover, because
xA and xB are sampled in precisely the same manner, it suffices to show that this manner of sampling
produces x-coordinates indistinguishable from the uniform distribution.
Let X be the uniform distribution over length-r binary strings: for x ∈ {0,1}r, PrX(x) = 12r . Let Y
be the distribution over the x-coordinates of points sampled according to the manner used in the given
protocol. Note that since the curve is defined over GF (2r), (x, ⋅) is on the curve if and only if x ∈ GF (2r)
which can occur if and only if x ∈ {0,1}r, so the support of the two distributions is the same.
By F1, for every x ∈ GF (2m), there is at most one point (x, y) which lies on the curve. As a result,
every point on the curve has a unique x-coordinate, and so the subgroup defined by the generator G
defines a subset of {0,1}m which may be sampled; furthermore, by selecting a random unique point in the
subgroup with nG, n chosen uniformaly at random from 1...n− 1, we are equivalently selecting uniformly
at random among this subset S ⊆ {0,1}m.
The size of S is equivalent to the size of the subgroup defined by G:
∣S∣ = n − 1 = N
h
− 1
(where N is the number of points on the curve and h is the cofactor). Since we have chosen the curve
such that the cofactor is less than 4, we have
∣S∣ ≥ N
4
− 1
Using a straight-forward application of Hasse’s theorem for elliptic curves, we can obtain a lower bound
on N which we can then use to lower bound ∣S∣:
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∣N − 2r − 1∣ ≤ 2
√
2r (Hasse’s theorem)
⇒2r + 1 −N ≤ 2r/2+1
−N ≤ 2r/2 − 2r − 1
⇒N ≥ 2r − 2r/2 − 1
N ≥ 2r/2(2r/2 − 1) − 1
N ≥ 2r/22r/2−1 − 1
N ≥ 2r−1 − 1
N ≥ 2r−2
We now use this to obtain a lower bound on ∣S∣:
∣S∣ ≥ N
4
− 1
≥
2r−2
4
− 1
≥ 2r−5
To establish indistinguishability, we now show that the statistical distance between the distributions X
and Y is small. For any element x ∈ {0,1}r, we know PrX(x) = 12r . But, for Y , we know via the lower
bound on the size of S that
PrY (x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 x /∈ S
1
2r
≤ ⋅ ≤ 1
2r−5
x ∈ S
and so the statistical distance between X and Y , ∆(X,Y ) is
∆(X,Y ) = supx∈{0,1}m(∣PrX(x) − PrY (y)∣)
≤
1
2r−5
−
1
2r
= negligible(r)⇒ negligible(k)
Since the statistical distance is negligible, we assume that the x-coordinate sampled is indistinguishable
from random. We thus conclude by the guarantees of EMBED/EXTRACT that the transcript is indis-
tinguishable from the underlying channel distribution.
The only remaining element of security to prove is that an adversary does not gain knowledge of the
shared key. This follows directly from the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman assumption.
5.3 Quantum-safe Steganography: Black-box OEE Application of the RLWE
Key Exchange
In [2], Ding et. al. give a relatively simple cryptographic key exchange secure under the ring learning with
errors (RLWE) assumption. We show that we may apply this exchange in a black-box fashion to obtain a
steganographic key exchange which is secret under the decisional variant of the RLWE assumption. One
point of significance of this attempt is that it shows the existence of quantum-safe (under our current
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knowledge, of course) steganography.
The Protocol We illustrate this protocol and its OEE application by explicitly enumerating its steps.
We reiterate that this protocol is identical to the one given in [2], save for the fact that we utilize OEE
during communication between initiator and responder.
Let A be the protocol initiator, communicating on channel CA. Let B be the protocol responder, commu-
nicating on channel CB. Pick a public EMBED/EXTRACT procedure EMBED(⋅, ⋅, c)˙/EXTRACT (⋅, ⋅, ⋅)
for CA and CB which is satisfactory for D chosen as the uniform random distribution.
Choose a prime q, a degree n, a polynomial a, a ring Rq = Zq/Φ(x) suitable for security parameter
λ (wlog, q > 2λ) (we omit details such as the choice of specific prime) as a set of public parameters.
Additionally fix a sampling method.
The protocol initiator performs the following steps:
1. Sample two small polynomials sA and eA.
2. Compute pA = asA + 2eI (let pA be represented as a list of coefficients).
3. Publish uˆ = EMBED(CA, h(0)A , pA) on channel CA, updating channel histories as usual.
4. Receive vˆ = EMBED(CB, h(1)B , pB ∣∣ w) on channel CB.
5. Obtain pB ∣∣ w = EXTRACT (CB, h(1)B , vˆ).
6. Sample a small polynomial e′A.
7. Compute kA = pBsA + 2e′A = asAsB + 2eBsA + 2e
′
A.
8. Obtain key bits by applying the coefficient-wise opperation (k(i)A +wi q−12 ) mod q mod 2 (eliminating
error terms).
The protocol responder performs the following:
1. Sample two small polynomials sB and eB.
2. Compute pB = asB + 2eB.
3. Receive uˆ = EMBED(CA, h(0)A , pA) on channel CA.
4. Obtain pA = EXTRACT (CA, h(0)A , uˆ).
5. Sample a small polynomial e′B.
6. Compute kB = pAsB + 2e′B = asAsB + 2eAsB + 2e
′
B.
7. Obtain reconcilliation information w coefficient-wise as
wi =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 k
(i)
B ∈ [− q4 , q4 ]
1 else
8. Publish vˆ = EMBED(CB, h(1)B , pB ∣∣ w) on channel CB, updating channel histories as usual.
9. Obtain key bits in the same manner as A, using kB instead of kA.
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The correctness of this protocol follows directly from the correctness of the EMBED/EXTRACT and the
correctness of the original RLWE key exchange protocol.
Proof of security Note that the confidentiality of the product (the produced key) follows from the security
of the original RLWE key exchange. All that remains to be shown is that the messages exchanged during
protocol execution are indistinguishable from the underlying channel distribution.
Lemma 1 pA, pB, and kB are indistinguishable from polynomials chosen randomly from Fq under
the decisional RLWE assumption.
That this holds for pA = asA + 2eI and pB = asB + 2eB is a direct consequence of the decisional RLWE
assumption; the case for kB = asAsB +2eAsB +2e′B is nearly as direct. Since pA and pB are indistinguish-
able, that an adversary has knowledge of them is of no consequence. Assume that kB is distinguishable;
then there exists a polytime distinguisher D which succeeds with non-negligible probability. We can then
construct a general-case distinguisher for the RLWE problem as follows:
1. Receive pair (a(x), b(x)), where b(x) is either b(x) = asA + 2eA or a random polynomial.
2. Sample small polynomials sB, e
′
B and compute b
′(x) = b(x)sB + 2e′B.
3. Pass b′(x) to D and return the result.
Consider the case when b(x) is random. Then b′(x) is random, and we expect D to indicate such with non-
negligible probability. Consider the case when b(x) = b(x) = asA+2eA. Then b′(x) = asAsB +2eAeB +2e′B,
and we expect B to distinguish as such with high probability. Thus our general-case distinguisher also
distinguishes properly with non-negligible probability, which is impossible under the decisional RLWE
assumption.
Lemma 2 Let r be the least integer such that 2r ≥ q. The coefficients of pA and pB are computa-
tionally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0,1}rn.
By Lemma 1, pA and pB are indistinguishable from polynomials chosen at random from Fq. Consider the
case for any polynomial sampled in the manner of pA or pB. Any individual coefficient must necessarily
be indistinguishable from the distribution
pXi(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
q
x ≤ q
0 q < x ≤ 2r
and must also appear to be independent. For a truly random coefficient, the distribution should be
pYi(x) =
1
2r
also independent. We therefore have that, the PDF of all n sampled coefficients takes one of two values,
PX(x) ∈ {0, q−n}. The PDF of truly random coefficients would be PY (x) = 12nr . Since both 12rn − 0 and
1
q
− 1
2rn
= 1
2r(n−1)
are both negligible, we conclude that the two distributions are statistically indistin-
guishable. Further, since Lemma 1 gives us that the coefficients of pA and pB must be computationally
indistinguishable from X , pA and pB must therefore be computationally indistinguishable from Y .
Lemma 3 w is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over bit strings of length n.
For a polynomial chosen at random from Fq, the probability that coefficient i is in the range [− q4 , q4 ]
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(the probability that wi = 0) is exactly equal to
q
2
q−1
= q
q−1
1
2
, a negligible factor off of 1
2
. By Lemma 1,
kB is indistinguishable from a polynomial chosen at random from Fq, and so it must hold that wi = 0
with probability negligibly far from 1
2
(and thus that wi = 1 with probability negligibly far from
1
2
). Since
this holds for all coordinates, the entire bit string of w must be computationally indistinguishable from a
uniformly random string of n bits.
Note now that the only inputs to EMBED/EXTRACT are pA, pB, and w. Since we have shown
that these are each indistinguishable from the uniform random distribution under decisional RLWE, the
indistinguishability of produced covertexts follows directly from the choice of EMBED and EXTRACT.
6 Directions for Future Work
6.1 Using OEE to Decouple Channels from Objectives
Thus far, we have shown that operate-embed-extract may be applied to easily achieve new stegano-
graphic objectives, extend existing ones, and to easily connect techniques in standard cryptography to
steganography. As has been a theme, we have been able to do this without relying on specific channel
characterizations while simultaneously not limiting things like efficiency and communication rate.
In the same manner in which we may use OEE to give provably secret steganographic constructions
for any channel, we may also use the paradigm to engineer ways in which to maximize rate of secrecy and
address implementation concerns in specific channels for any objective. In this sub-section, we suggest
and discuss potential future work in this specific area.
6.1.1 Cryptography as a Channel
In the report preceeding this one, we explored the prospect of using cryptographic primitives and protocols
as steganographic channels. In particular, we used the fact that initialization vectors (IVs) are generally
expected to appear uniformly random in order to design and implement symmetric-key stegosystems in
the tone of those suggested in [1].
We briefly show in this section that OEE allows us to generalize such an approach to apply for
any objective achievable with an OEE scheme. Beginning by converting the specific approach used in
the previous report into an EMBED/EXTRACT procedure applicable across objectives, we give some
discussion on how to extend this technique even further in order to apply to other primitives, taking
garbled circuits as an example.
We note that work in this area seems to be particularly valuable because the ability to use cryptog-
raphy for steganography translates to an ability to use any system implementing cryptography to obtain
a system implementing steganography without excessive effort; this opens the door for future studies on the
IV Steganography: One Approach Our previous report showed that any block cipher mode of
operation making use of an explicitly conveyed uniformly random initialization vector may be used se-
curely as a cover channel in the context of specific private-key stegosystems hiding 1 bit of secret per 1
bit of covertext. Following our exposition of OEE, we see that something stronger is true: any such block
cipher mode of operation may be used securely as a cover channel in the context of ANY steganographic
objective which may be achieved with an OEE stegosystem while achieving the same rate.
Under the OEE paradigm, all that must be shown is the existence of an EMBED/EXTRACT proce-
dure secure for some input distribution D. In the case of a channel C whose support consists of uniformly
random IVs of length b, the identity operation satisfies this definition when we take D as the uniform
distribution over b-bit strings. Because the input distribution is precisely the same as the channel distri-
bution in this case, indistinguishability, validity, and the 1:1 rate of this EMBED/EXTRACT procedure
follow directly.
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Other Approaches Future work, of course, should concern itself with either presenting new tech-
niques for other primitives or suggesting ways to extend the one suggested. One interesting possibility
which we have noted is the ability to apply this very technique to garbled circuits: in the same manner in
which the identity operation serves as a satisfactory EMBED/EXTRACT procedure for initialization
vector, the same can be said about individual wire keys in a garbled circuit. There are several possibilities
for exploration here. We briefly discuss two:
1. EMBED/EXTRACT procedures which hide messages across multiple wires. One obvious method
is to hide a message across some path of wires from some input bit to some output bit; another
could be to encode messages across individual ‘levels’ of the circuit.
2. How to balance privacy with a desire for covert communication. Clearly, if every key hides a
message that our computational partner may obtain (say we are both trying to compute a function
securely with our partner and communicate steganographically), we compromise privacy. One area
of exploration could involve looking at how we can balance a desire to communicate covertly at a
high rate while maintaining some quantifiable degree of privacy with a partner.
6.1.2 Natural Language Channels
As we noted in our previous report, the value of a stegosystem employed in practice is intimately related
to how much we can expect to be able to rely on the presence of specific channels we know to admit high
rate. In the case of cryptography as a channel, for example, a nation-state might simply outlaw the use of
cryptography in order to prevent steganographic communication. As such, the use of natural language as
a steganographic channel seems to be an extremely valuable goal because it is much harder to regulate.
In this section, we discuss some difficulties and directions in this area.
Choosing Subliminal Features As of now, the only truly ‘obvious’ approach to using natural languages
for steganography is the simple application of the proven universal embedding procedures we previously
discussed. While they guarantee security in theory, the requirement that there exists an oracle for the
channel–essentially a natural language oracle–poses particular challenges. For example, if we are to use
a human as an oracle, we’re almost guaranteed to lose with respect to the rate of secrecy possible. For
example, if we require our oracle to hide at the granularity of words (1 bit of secrecy per word), a human
will quickly exhaust his or her ability to paraphrase before the entire message may be embedded for
messages longer than a few bits. We may, however, sample at a coarser granularity, say at the level of
sentences and paragraphs, and achieve human oracle feasibility at the cost of a lower rate.
As such, it makes sense to consider different language-based features to use in the context of universal
approaches. One possibility which we have considered is the idea of hiding in the medium of language
rather than the language itself. In particular, we have considered the possibility of hiding on a per-letter
basis in hand-written language. If there is enough natural variance in the way a human writes the same
letter of the alphabet across multiple attempts, for example, we may be able to achieve both high rate (on
the order of one bit per letter) and human oracle feasibility. The relevance of this approach in modern
times is dubitable, however, when we consider that people only rarely communicate via hand-written
messages.
Constructing Non-human Oracles The previous discussion assumed a need to use human oracles.
It might be possible to instead develop non-human oracles (e.g. a paraphrasing model) which is capable
of praphrasing accurately and in high volume, but this seems especially challenging in that such a model
would need to be virtually perfect in order to guarantee security.
In particular, an interesting task we could propose in the context of NLP which might address our
concerns in a heuristic sense (or in an exact sense if we can expect perfect models) while admitting high
rate is a task which might perhaps be described as ‘indexed paraphrasing’: given a partial message m, a
statement s, and an index i, determine the ith paraphrase of s according to some arbitrary ordering of
all statements with the same meaning and style as s with respect to m. This task seems to be extremely
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hard, if not impossible, and so it may be better to instead invest time into either constructing high-quality
simple paraphrase models or simply determining clever language-based features to use in conjunction with
universal embedding.
6.2 Steganographic Public-key Infrastructures (S-PKIs)
Hopper and von Ahn’s original paper on public-key steganography [4] raises a concern regarding a topic
extremely important to the practical deployment of infrastructure making use of steganography at scale:
the issue of distributing, maintaining, and verifying steganographic keys. In the context of steganography,
many problems relating to key management, non-repudiation, and authentication suddenly become hard.
As the authors note, it seems that the use of steganographic key exchange protocols may be necessary.
The authors note that it also appears to be necessary to have a ‘one-bit secret channel’ which may be
used to indicate that somebody is attempting to perform a steganographic key exchange, but this is not
strictly true in practice. For example, all members of the S-PKI may simply maintain a directory of
other members and institute a policy that all members initiate communication using a steganographic key
exchange and then use that key to indicate to either (a) abort steganographic interaction or (b) continue.
As such, one route of inquiry could explore whether it’s possible to develop an enveloping procedure
using steganographic key exchanges to convert a standard PKI into an S-PKI. Even if we could do so,
however, there are still some outlying questions which must be answered. Some of these include the
following:
1. How do you handle malicious insiders? An insider which leaks a public key may potentially reveal
the entire steganographic network.
2. How do you induct new members into the steganographic network?
3. How do you remove members from the steganographic network? Do you have to re-issue all keys?
The obvious remedy required by the above is a more nuanced approach to trust and the manner in which
it is verified and acted upon: future work would do well to focus on this topic.
While steganography is both interesting and potentially of great value to the world, our lack of means
to manage steganographic interaction at scale could possibly be the largest barrier to its realization. As
such, future work should certainly seek to address these gaps.
7 Conclusion
This report has sought to explore steganography beyond the scope of private-key steganography, introduc-
ing a paradigm through which we may consider any number of other goals. Beginning with an exploration
of the current formalism for public-key steganography given in [4], this report attempts to condense ex-
isting work into a unifying design paradigm that admits provably secret constructions while allowing for
both universal constructions and constructions with channel-specific optimizations. We show the utility
of this paradigm by using it to design alternative public-key constructions and even achieve a new goal,
distributed steganography. Following a presentation of this paradigm and its applications, we conclude
with a general discussion of (1) how this paradigm may be further applied to address issues in practice
and (2) other issues preventing widespread use of steganography.
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